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JURISDICTION 
THE APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION IS 
GROUNDLESS, IN THAT RULE 3 OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE WAS 
PROPERLY INVOKED IN THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE FAILS TO INCLUDE IN HER 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE THAT SHE FILED A AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF HER ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ON MAY 7, 1990, IN WHICH SHE 
"REQUEST THAT THE COURT TERMINATE PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION 
RIGHTS WITH LAURA" (RECORD a 224). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE APPELLEE'S STATEMENT # 4 CONTAINS THE WRONG DATE 
OF THE MENTIONED HEARING "INSTEAD OF DECEMBER 3, THE HEARING 
WAS HELD ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1988. 
STATEMENT # 9 SHOULD REFLECT THE APPELLANT LEFT THE 
STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS A TRAVELING SALESMAN AND THAT THE 
APPELLANT WAS NOT CONTINUOUSLY OUT THE STATE DURING THAT 
TIME PERIOD SO DESCRIBED THEREIN. 
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STATEMENT # 11 is MISLEADING IN THAT JUDGE SAWAYA 
"SUSPENDED PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION WITH THE PARTIES MINOR 
CHILD." WHEN IN FACT JUDGE SAWAYA ORDERED AT # 4 OF HIS 
ORDER, "PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION RIGHTS WITH THE MINOR 
CHILD, LAURA, ARE HEREBY TERMINATED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF 
THIS COURT. PLAINTIFF IS HEREBY RESTRAINED FROM HAVING ANY 
CONTACT WITH DEFENDANT OR HER DAUGHTER, LAURA." (RECORD 3 
269-70). 
STATEMENT # 12 is MISLEADING AGAIN FOR THE SAME REASONS 
AS STATED ABOVE. 
STATEMENT # 15 SHOULD REFLECT THE DATE OF JUDGE 
MURPHY'S ORDER TO BE AUGUST 7, AS STATEMENT # 16 so STATES. 
NOTE: APPELLEE RECOUNTS THE SEVERAL TIMES APPELLANT HAS BEEN 
SERVED WITH ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE AND LIST THE SEVERAL 
JUDGEMENTS SHE HAS OBTAINED AGAINST APPELLANT, IT IS 
IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT NEITHER JUDGE BANKS OR JUDGE FISHLER 
FOUND THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT, AND THAT THE 
JUDGEMENTS OBTAINED BY APPELLEE WAS BY STIPULATION. ON APRIL 
8, 1988, AT A HEARING APPELLEE'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, JUDGE 
FISHLER ALLOWED THE APPELLANT FIVE DAYS IN WHICH TO FILE A 
PETITION TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE AND LOWER THE SUPPORT 
PAYMENTS, AND STAYED CONTEMPT PROCEEDING AGAINST APPELLANT 
UNTIL A HEARING COULD BE HELD AND IT COULD BE DETERMINED THE 
ABILITY OF APPELLANT TO PAY SUPPORT, (RECORD 3 8 4 ) . 
APPELLANT DID FILE SAID PETITION AND ATTEMPTED TO PROCEED 
WITH THE ISSUE AND OBTAINED A PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT HEARING 
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ARGUMENT 
(APPELLANT IS REFERRING TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS BY 
NUMBER BECAUSE HE DOES NOT HAVE A CONVENIENT WAY TO RESTATE 
THE HEADING.) 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 1: 
THE APPELLEE ATTEMPTS TO DRAW A DISTINCTION* IN HER 
FIRST ARGUMENT. BETWEEN THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHT 
AND SUSPENSION OF THOSE RIGHTS. THE COURT SHOULD BE AWARE 
THE APPELLEE HAS SOUGHT THE "TERMINATION" OF THE APPELLANT'S 
VISITATION RIGHTS* (RECORD AT 232"233). BOTH THE JULY 13* 
1990 AND THE JANUARY 9* 1991* ORDERS OF JUDGE SAWAYA* 
WRITTEN BY THE APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY* USE THE WORD 
"TERMINATED" AND NOT AS APPELLEE NOW WANTS FOR THIS ARGUMENT 
"SUSPENDED". EVEN IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
WITH WAS SET FOR FEBRUARY 13* 1987, 
(RECORD a 104). THE APPELLEE OBJECTED TO THE HEARING, 
(RECORD a 105). APPELLANT FELT THAT BECAUSE OF THE ORDER OF 
APRIL 22, 1986, THE APPELLEE WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE ISSUE 
BEFORE SHE COULD PROCEED AGAINST APPELLANT AND HE LET THE 
ISSUE RIDE. AS OF THE APRIL 22, 1986 ORDER THE APPELLANT HAD 
BEEN PAYING WHAT HE COULD IN SUPPORT* AND HAD BEEN PAYING 
BETWEEN $200.00 AND $400.00 PER MONTH FOR THE PRIOR YEAR; 
(RECORD a 80-82). APPELLEE BROUGHT THE APPELLANT TO COURT* 
IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR APPELLEE'S 
DENIAL OF VISITATION. FOR THE NON-PAYMENT SUPPORT AND 
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LAW* AGAIN WRITTEN BY THE APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY* HE USES THE 
TERM "TERMINATION" AND NOT "SUSPENSION*. THE APPELLEE AND 
HER ATTORNEY CLEARLY WANTED AND SUCCEEDED IN HAVING JUDGE 
SAWAYA TERMINATE THE VISITATION RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT. 
HOWEVER* APPELLEE NOW WANTS TO QUICKLY CHANGE HORSES AND 
CLAIM THOSE RIGHTS WERE ONLY "SUSPENDED". THE APPELLANT 
MAINTAINS THE DISTINCTION IS SEMANTICAL IN THAT THERE IS NO 
ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS ANY LEGAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEE TWO 
AND THE EFFECT IS THE SAME "APPELLANT AND HIS DAUGHTER DO 
NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF EACH OTHER'S COMPANY. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT STATED IN SWAYNE V. L.D.S. 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 795 P.2D 637 (1990): "THE FOURTEEN 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION STATES IN PART: 
'NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH 
SHALL. . .DEPRIVE ANY PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR THE PROPERTY 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, NOR DENY TO ANY PERSON WITHIN 
ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.'(EMPHASIS 
CONTRARY TO THE APRIL 22* 1986 ORDER JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THE 
APPELLANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND SIGNED THE DECEMBER 16* 
1988 ORDER COMMITTING THE APPELLANT TO SERVE 30 DAYS IN JAIL 
FOR CONTEMPT. DURING THE MONTHS OF FEBRUARY THOUGH APRIL THE 
APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE A LOWER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT 
WITH THE APPELLEE AND THOSE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. DURING THE 
ELEVEN YEARS OF THE DIVORCE THE APPELLANT HAS EITHER PAY OR 
ATTEMPTED NEGOTIATE TO PAY SUPPORT A LITTLE UNDER NINE 
YEARS. 
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ADDED.) THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IS THE 
DEPRIVATION OF A LIBERITY INTEREST WORTHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION." CLEARLY, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT BELIEVES THAT 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND DAUGHTER IS ONE THAT IS 
PROTECTED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
THE APPELLEE FAILS TO SHOW FROM THE RECORD OR BY ANY 
LOGICAL INFERENCE THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
"SUSPENSION" AND "TERMINATION* IN LAW. EVEN GRANTING THAT 
THERE MAYBE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO TERMS. THE APPELLEE 
HAS NOT SHOWN. SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. THAT THE APPELLANT 
IS NOT PERMANENTLY BEING DEPRIVED OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
HIS DAUGHTER. LAURA. THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW NOR DID THE 
JUDGE FIND THAT THE APPELLANT HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY THE 
AMOUNT REQUIRED TO REINSTATE HIS VISITATION WITH HIS 
DAUGHTER. AND IF THE APPELLANT CANNOT PAY THE AMOUNTS. WHICH 
THE APPELLANT CLAIMS, THE RIGHTS WILL NEVER BE REINSTATED. 
THE APPELLEE FAILS TO SHOW EITHER IN LAW OR IN LOGIC 
THAT ONE CAN "SUSPEND" OR "TERMINATE" THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 
ANOTHER WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OR UTAH. THE SOUTHERN STATES WOULD LIKE TO BEEN ABLE 
TO SAY. "WE ARE NOT VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACKS 
BECAUSE SOMEDAY THEY WILL BE ABLE TO RIDE IN THE FRONT OF 
THE BUS. EAT AT THE RESTAURANT. OR BUY THIS HOUSE. ITS JUST 
THAT THEY CANNOT DO THOSE THINGS AT THE PRESENT TIME. BUT 
WHEN THEY CHANGE TO FIT OUR STANDARDS THEY MAY HAVE THESE 
RIGHTS THAT WE NOW DENY THEM." 
THE APPELLEE NEXT ARGUES THAT BECAUSE THERE ARE CASES 
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THAT HAVE SUSPENDED PARENTAL RIGHTS THAT MAKES THIS INSTANCE 
OF TERMINATION CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT. THE APPELLANT NEVER 
ARGUES THAT THERE ARE NOT TIMES WHEN PARENTAL RIGHTS CANNOT 
BE TERMINATED* ONLY THAT THERE IS NOT A CASE IN LAW THAT HAS 
TERMINATED THOSE RIGHTS FOR THE REASON GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN THIS CASE. FOR THAT REASON* THE APPELLANT BELIEVES 
THIS TO BE UNUSUAL. THEREFORE QUALIFYING FOR PROTECTION 
UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PROVISION OF THE ELGHT AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
THE APPELLANT TAKES PERSONAL OFFENSE IN THE STATEMENT OF 
THE APPELLEE THAT HE "PHYSICALLY ABANDONED HER", (HIS 
DAUGHTER, LAURA), "BETWEEN FEBRUARY. 1989 UNTIL AFTER 
NOVEMBER, 1989." THIS STATEMENT IS FALSE. THE APPELLEE 
FILED A AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE IN THE DISTRICT COURT ON NOVEMBER 26. 1990. (EXHIBIT A 
OF APPENDIX). IN THAT AFFIDAVIT THE APPELLEE AND HER 
ATTORNEY STATES: "DEFENDANT ADMITS THAT DURING THE PERIOD OF 
FEBRUARY 1989 THROUGH NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER 1989 SHE REFUSED 
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO HAVE VISITATION." IT IS DEPLORABLE 
THAT THE APPELLEE AND HER ATTORNEY, WHO ALSO SIGNED THE 
ABOVE AFFIDAVIT, CAN DENY APPELLANT HIS VISITATION WITH HIS 
DAUGHTER AND THEN LAY CLAIM THAT HE ABANDONED HER! 
THE APPELLEE AND HER ATTORNEY NEXT SUGGEST THAT "THE 
DISTRICT COURT IS NOT PUNISHING PLAINTIFF FOR HIS BELIEFS 
BUT ONLY TRYING TO IMPRESS UPON PLAINTIFF HIS PROPER 
BEHAVIOR AND RESPONSIBILITY TO HIS DAUGHTER." THERE IS 
NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THIS STATEMENT AT ALL. THE 
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FACTS ARE CLEAR; JUDGE SAWAYA CERTAINLY INTENDED TO PUNISH 
THE APPELLANT/ THE RECORD IS FULL OF CITES WHERE JUDGE 
SAWAYA STATED JUST THAT. HOWEVER, THE APPELLANT WILL REFER 
THIS COURT TO HEARING ON JUNE 18, 1990 WHERE JUDGE SAWAYA 
ORIGINALLY TERMINATED APPELLANT VISITATIONS, WHERE JUDGE 
SAWAYA STATES: "YOU MAKE NO REAL EFFORT, AS I SEE IT, TO PAY 
ANY MONEY TO THIS WOMAN TO HELP SUPPORT YOU OWN CHILD. So I 
FIND YOU IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. I AM GOING TO TAKE AWAY YOU 
VISITATION PRIVILEGES FOR THAT." (PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING DATED JUNE 18, 1 9 9 0 ) . 
IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE AT THIS POINT THAT THE ENTIRE 
PROCEEDING WAS COMMENCE BY AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO PUNISH 
THE APPELLANT FOR HIS NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 2: 
APPELLEE 
PLAINTIFF'S I 
CONTUMACIOUS, 
RECORD OF THE 
ARGUES THAT 
SJON-
BUT 
PAYMENT OF 
JUDGE 
CHILD 
APPELLEE FAILS TO : 
ABILITY OF 
PAYMENT EITHER 
OF WILLFULNESS IN 
IN WHOLE 
THE 
OR 
NOT PAYING 
BY THE APPELLANT IS NOT 
RECORD, THERE IS 
SUCH A FINDING. 
TRIAL COURT ANY 
NOT ANY 
NOWHERE 
FACTS 
SAWAYA 
SUPPORT ' 
SHOW ANY 
APPELLANT TO PAY 
IN PART . JUDGE S, 
HIS COURT-ORDER 
SUPPORTED BY ANY 
EVIDENCE IN 
DID THE 
TO 
FOUND 
WAS WILLFUL 
EVIDENCE 
SAID 
AWAYA'S 
CHILD 
; IN 
THAT 
AND 
THE 
SUPPORT 
FINDING 
SUPPORT 
CITES FROM 
THE RECORD TO 
APPELLEE PRESENT 
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' TO 
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APPELLANT TO PAY SAID SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF $250.00 PER 
MONTH OR THAT THE APPELLANT HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY ANY OF 
THE BACK CHILD SUPPORT. THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE FINANCIAL 
CAPABILITY OF THE. APPELLANT WAS THAT HE SPENT MONEY ON HIS 
DAUGHTER THAT APPELLEE CLAIMED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO HER 
AS CHILD SUPPORT* AND EVEN THE AMOUNT SPENT ON HIS DAUGHTER 
DID NOT EQUAL THE AMOUNT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT. 
APPELLEE CLAIMS THAT APPELLANT CITES CASES OUT OF 
CONTEXT. APPELLEE DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT PARTS OF THE 
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT - THE ARGUMENT OF 
THE APPELLEE SEEMS TO BE THAT THE CASES ARE IRRELEVANT TO 
THE ISSUE AT BAR. 
IN $LAPE VT DENNIS* 594 p.2D 898* CITED BY APPELLANT 
STANDS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT ONLY UNDER EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD IS JEOPARDIZED 
WILL A FATHER BE DENIED VISITATION RIGHTS. HERE THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT DISCUSSES WHAT IS MEANT BY THE JEOPARDIZING 
THE WELFARE OF THE TO POINT THAT IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO 
TERMINATE VISITATION RIGHTS! 
"COURTS HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO FIND THAT THE PRESENCE 
OF SOME EMOTIONAL UPSET BY ITSELF* RESULTING FROM EXERCISE 
OF VISITATION RIGHTS* SUFFICIENTLY JEOPARDIZES A CHILD 
WELFARE SO AS TO REQUIRE THE DRASTIC ACTION OF DENYING ITS 
PARENTS VISITS WITH THE CHILD* ALTOGETHER." 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SHOW ANY EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS OF THE CHILD. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE EITHER DIRECT OF 
INDIRECT THAT MY DAUGHTER, LAURA, HAS BEEN AFFECTED* IN A 
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NEGATIVE WAY, BY OUR VISITS TOGETHER OR THAT THEY CAUSE 
LAURA ANY EMOTIONAL UPSET. THEREFORE, JUDGE SAWAYA'S ORDER 
TERMINATING OUR VISITATION TOGETHER IS SIMPLY UNSUPPORTED BY 
FACTS OR ANY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. JUDGE SAWAYA'S ORDER 
FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF SLADE. 
JUDGE SAWAYA WAS REVERSED BY THIS COURT ON A SIMILAR 
ISSUE FOR DENYING A FATHER VISITATION RIGHTS, BECAUSE, AS HE 
FOUND THAT IT WAS IN THE "BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD". IN 
T.R.F. v FELAN, 760 P.2D 906 (UTAH APP. 1988), THIS COURT 
STATED AT 914 (5) "PARENTAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE TERMINATED BY 
MERELY APPLYING THE 'BEST INTERESTS' OF THE CHILD STANDARD 
BUT, RATHER, THERE MUST BE A SHOWING OF THE PARENT'S 
UNFITNESS, ABANDONMENT, OR SUBSTANTIAL NEGLECT. 
IN RE J.P., 648 P.2D AT 1375. 
[TJHE RIGHT OF A PARENT NOT TO BE DEPRIVED OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS WITHOUT SUCH A SHOWING IS SO FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR 
SOCIETY AND SO BASIC TO OUR CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER...THAT IT 
RANKS AMONG THOSE RIGHTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE I, § 25 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION AS BEING RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE. 
THIS RECOGNITION OF DUE PROCESS AND RETAINED RIGHTS OF 
PARENTS PROMOTES VALUES ESSENTIAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF 
HUMAN FREEDOM AND DIGNITY AND TO THE PERPETUATION OF OUR 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY." 
THE WEST V WEST, 487 p.2D 96, CASE INVOLVED CHILD 
SUPPORT AND AN ORDER TO PAY $7.50 FOR EXPENSES TO BRING THE 
CHILD TO A NEUTRAL VISITATION SITE. THE OREGON APPEALS COURT 
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SAID THAT YOU CANNOT CONDITION VISITATION ON CHILD SUPPORT 
BUT YOU CAN REQUIRE THE "NOMINAL" PAYMENT OF THE $7.50 
EXPENSE. THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY APPELLEE IN HER BRIEF WAS 
THAT THE OREGON COURT LET STAND A LOWER COURT DECISION 
CONDITIONING VISITATION UPON PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
THE APPELLEE CITED REARDON V. REARDON, 415 P.2D 574, A 
ARIZONA APPEALS COURT DECISION FROM OVER 25 YEARS AGO. THE 
APPELLEE HAS FAILED TO NOTE THAT IN 1973 THE ARIZONA 
LEGISLATORS BY STATUE MODIFIED THE EFFECT OF REARDON, WHEN 
THEY PASSED A.R.S. § 25-337 (A): 
"A PARENT NOT GRANTED CUSTODY OF THE CHILD IS ENTITLED 
TO REASONABLE VISITATION RIGHTS UNLESS THE COURTS FINDS, 
AFTER A HEARING, THAT VISITATION WOULD ENDANGER SERIOUSLY 
THE CHILD'S PHYSICAL, MENTAL, MORAL OR EMOTIONAL HEALTH." 
IN 1981 THE ARIZONA APPEALS COURT USED THIS LANGUAGE IN 
REFERRING TO THE REARDON CITE: 
"GENERALLY, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO LIMIT THE 
VISITATION RIGHTS OF THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT IS COMMITTED 
TO SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRAIL COURT BUT THE POWER IS TO 
BE EXERCISED WITH CAUTION AND RESTRAINT. ONLY UNDER 
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD A PARENT BE DENIED THE 
RIGHT OF VISITATION. REARDON V. REARDON." $HOLTY )U 
SHERRILL, 632 p.2D 268 (ARIZ. APP. 1981). OBVIOUSLY, THE 
ARIZONA COURT NOW HOLDS THAT EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
MUST NOW EXISTS BEFORE A COURT CAN DENY VISITATION RIGHTS, 
AND THE LEGISLATURE OF ARIZONA DEFINES BY STATUE WHAT THOSE 
"EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES" ARE AS THOSE THAT WOULD 
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SERIOUSLY ENDANGER THE CHILD'S PHYSICAL. MENTAL; MORAL OR 
EMOTIONAL HEALTH. THE APPELLEE RELIANCE ON R E A R D O N , FAILS TO 
MEET THOSE REVISED STANDARD. 
APPELLANT CALLS THE COURT ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT 
IT WAS THE APPELLANT NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS VISITATION (PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
JUNE 18 HEARING) AND THAT ALL THAT IS REQUIRED TO REINSTATED 
HIS VISITATION AGAIN IS THE PAYMENT OF $150.00 PER MONTH AND 
THE CONTINUED $ 450.00 TO KEEP THE COURT FROM NOT SUSPENDING 
THE VISITATION AGAIN. (JANUARY 9I O R D E R ) . CLEARLY THAT IS 
CONDITIONING VISITATION UPON THE PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
AND NOTHING ELSE. THE APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY IS 
JUST LEGAL SOPHISTRY NOT FOUNDED IN FACT AND CERTAINLY NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY PART OF THE RECORD. 
THE APPELLANT LEAVES TO THIS COURT THE DETERMINATION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THOSE CASES CITED BY APPELLANT HAVE ANY 
APPLICABILITY TO THIS CASE. THE APPELLANT ASKS THIS COURT TO 
TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE LIST IN THE APPENDIX OF OVER 40 
OTHER CASES WHERE THE COURTS HAVE UNIVERSALLY HELD THAT IT 
IS WRONG TO DENY VISITATION FOR THE REASON USED IN THIS 
CASE. 
THE APPELLEE'S REVIEW OF ROHR IS INFERRED AND DOES NOT 
FAIRLY REPRESENT ROHR . THE APPELLEE'S CONCLUSION 
"PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION WAS SUSPENDED TO IMPRESS A SENSE OF 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WELFARE OF HIS CHILD" IS SIMPLY A 
FABRICATION OF THE APPELLEE AND HER ATTORNEY AND IS NOT 
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SUPPORTED BY THE RECORDED NOR IS IT FOUND ANYWHERE IN THE 
RECORD. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT # 3. 
JUDGE SAWAYA ORDERED AT ONE HEARING ON JULY 16, 1990 
THAT THE APPELLANT PAY $ 50.00 PER WEEK TO STAY HIS 
IMPRISONMENT AND THEN IN THE ORDER OF JANUARY 9, 1991 
ORDERED THE APPELLANT TO PAY $ 450.00 PER MONTH FOR FOUR 
CONSECUTIVE TO REINSTATE HIS VISITATION AND THEN MAINTAIN 
SAID PAYMENT OR AUTOMATICALLY LOSE VISITATION AGAIN. THERE 
WAS NO CHOICE GIVEN TO APPELLANT EXCEPT TO PAY THE ABOVE 
ORDERS. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT # 4. 
APPELLEE'S RELIANCE UPON REARDQN IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR 
THE REASON DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THIS REPLY. APPELLANT DOES 
NOT CONTEND THAT THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT LIMIT VISITATION BUT 
THAT TO DO SO IN A HEARING FOR CONTEMPT IS NOT WITHIN THE 
TRIAL COURT CONTEMPT POWERS, THOSE POWERS ARE ENUMERATED IN 
U.C.A. § 78-32-10. THERE ARE PROCEDURES THAT ARE AVAILABLE 
FOR THE COURT TO USE TO LIMIT VISITATION RIGHTS, THOSE 
PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE NON~CUSTODIAL PARENT 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW BEFORE LOSING THEIR VISITATION RIGHTS. To 
SHORT CIRCUIT THOSE PROCESS DENIES THE NON~CUSTODIAL PARENT 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT § 5. 
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APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT FAILS TO CITE ANY AUTHORITY FOR 
THEIR POSITION AND AS STATED IN # 4 THE APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
VIOLATES THE UTAH STATUES AND THE DUE PROCESS OF APPELLANT. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT # 6. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT IS NONSENSIBLE. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE 
OF A RULE GOVERNING A PROCEDURE THAT CAN BE IGNORED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. APPELLEE STATES THAT PLAINTIFF CITES NC 
EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE SAWAYA FAILED TO REVIEW PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION. OTHER THAN THE APPELLEE STATING IN COURT THAT THE 
TIME HAD EXPIRED FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO OBJECT AND WHEN 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY OBJECTED TO JUDGE SAWAYA; STATING THAT 
OBJECTIONS HAD BEEN FILED; JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT BELIEVE 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY UNTIL IT WAS VERIFIED BY THE COURT 
COMPUTER* THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE SAWAYA CONSIDERED 
THOSE OBJECTIONS BEFORE SIGNING SAID ORDER. APPELLANT CALLS 
THE ATTENTION TO THIS COURT THAT A COURT REPORTER WAS NOT 
PRESENT DURING THE JULY 16; 1990; HEARING AND THEREFORE A 
TRANSCRIPT IS NOT AVAILABLE TO VERIFY EITHER THE ACCOUNT OF 
APPELLANT OR APPELLEE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED AT THE TIME 
APPELLANT FILED HIS OBJECTION TO SAID ORDER HE CALLED FOR A 
HEARING ON SAID OBJECTIONS; AND IT IS THE NORMAL PROCEDURE 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER A HEARIN ON THOSE 
OBJECTIONS TO SIGN THE PROPOSED ORDER. I BELIEVE THAT FACT 
ALONE TENDS TO SUPPORT THE APPELLANT'S POSITION. 
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APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT # 7. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT THAT JUDGE SAWAYA ACTIONS ARE ONLY 
THAT OF A JUDGE PERFORMING HIS DUTY. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT 
THE APPELLANT NEVER CLAIMED BECAUSE HE LOST IN A FAIR 
HEARING ON THE MERITS THAT JUDGE SAWAYA WAS PREJUDICE BUT 
BECAUSE OF ALL THE NON-APPROPRIATE ACTIONS OF JUDGE SAWAYA* 
AS LISTED IN NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS BEFORE THIS COURT* AND AS 
EXHIBITED IN THE NOVEMBER 26* 1990 HEARING WHICH CAN BE 
FOUND IN THE APPENDIX OF THIS REPLY* CLEARLY SHOWS HIS 
PREJUDICES AGAINST THE APPELLANT AND THAT APPELLANT CANNOT 
HAVE A FAIR HEARING IN FRONT OF JUDGE SAWAYA WHO WILL AT 
ONE TIME STATE THAT THE DENIAL OF VISITATION IS VERY 
DAMAGING TO MY DAUGHTER (SEE PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF JUNE 18* 
1990 HEARING) AND THEN WHEN THIS COURT REQUESTED THAT THE 
DENIAL OF VISITATION MUST BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
CHILD* FLIP-FLOP 180 DEGREES AND FIND THE BEST INTEREST OF 
THE CHILD IS THE DENIAL OF ANY CONTACT WITH HER FATHER* WHAT 
WE ARE LEFT WITH IS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BEST INTEREST OF 
LAURA IS VERY DAMAGING TO HER. SELF-CONTRADICTORY ? 
A VERY TELLING POINT IS THAT IN JUNE 18 JUDGE SAWAYA 
BELIEVED THAT HE COULD DENY VISITATION FOR THE NON-PAYMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT ALONE (SEE JUNE 18* 1990 TRANSCRIPT AT PG 
37 17-PG 38 4 ) AND THEN FOUND THE NON-PAYMENT WITHIN THAT 
CRITERIA AND TOOK NO EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE "BEST INTEREST 
OF THE CHILD"* AND DENIED VISITATION TO APPELLANT. THEN IN 
THE NOVEMBER 26* 1990 HEARING JUDGE SAWAYA STATED AT PG 14 
15 
LINE 10. "THE COURT: I FOUND INITIALLY THAT THERE WERE 
SUFFICIENT FACTS UPON WHICH TO BASE THAT ORDER. I AM GOING 
TO PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT WILL SUPPORT THAT ORDER 
NOW. AND I AM GOING TO ENTER IT SO YOU WILL AGAIN BE DENIED 
VISITATION." CLEARLY* JUDGE SAWAYA IS NOT LETTING THE 
EVIDENCE DICTATED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE BUT TRYING TO FIND 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS PREDETERMINE OUT COME. THE RECORD 
DOES NOT SUPPORT HIS FINDINGS, HOW CAN ONE BELIEVE HE WILL 
BE FAIRLY HEARD WHEN THE JUDGE ALREADY HAS DETERMINED THE 
OUT COME BEFORE THE HEARING BEGINS. 
THE TRIAL COURT FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED AND DO NOT INCLUDE EN0U6H 
SUBSIDIARY FACTS. 
THIS COURT IN RICHE V. RICHE, 784 P.2D 465 (UTAH APP. 
1989) AT 469 : "SMITH V SMITH, 726 p.2D 423 (UTAH 1986). IN 
SMITH, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT STATED: 
'THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETE, ACCURATE AND CONSISTENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT IN A CASE TRIED BY A JUDGE IS ESSENTIAL TO 
THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTE UNDER THE PROPER RULE OF LAW. TO 
THAT END THE FINDINGS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED AND 
INCLUDE ENOUGH SUBSIDIARY FACTS TO DISCLOSE THE STEPS BY 
WHICH THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON EACH FACTUAL ISSUE V.'AG 
REACHED. ' 
J_D_. AT 426 (QUOTING RUCKER V. DALTON, 598 p.2D 1336, 1338 
(UTAH 1979). THE COURT EXPLAINED THAT THE REASON FOR 
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REQUIRING SUCH FINDING IS TO ENSUE THAT THE DECISION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IS RATIONALLY BASED." 
JUDGE SAWAYA'S FINDINGS OF FACT DOES NOT MEET THE 
REQUIREMENT OF UTAH'S SUPREME COURT AND JUDGE SAWAYA'S 
FINDINGS WERE WRITTEN PURPOSELY TO BE VAGUE AS HE STATED IN 
THE NOVEMBER 26* 1990 HEARING: 
"MR. COLEY: WHEN YOU DO YOUR FINDINGS; COULD I ASK YOU 
TO IDENTIFY WHERE THEY COME FROM? 
THE COURT: YOU CAN ASKED ME TO BUT I AM CERTAINLY NOT 
GOING TO." (NOVEMBER 26, 1990 HEARING TRANSCRIPT). 
JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THE APPELLANT'S NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT TO BE WILLFUL. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY DEFINES 
"WILLFUL" AS "A ACT OR OMISSION IS 'WILLFULLY' DONE, IF DONE 
VOLUNTARILY AND INTENTIONALLY AND WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT 
TO FAIL TO DO SOMETHING THE LAW REQUIRES TO BE DONE) THAT IS 
TO SAY, WITH BAD PURPOSE EITHER TO DISOBEY OR TO DISREGARD 
THE LAW." (PG. 1599). JUDGE SAWAYA FINDINGS ONLY STATED THE 
APPELLANT FAILED TO PAY SUPPORT BUT REMAINS SILENCE IN 
REGARDS TO THE BAD PURPOSE DISTINCTION, WHEN HIS FINDINGS 
DOES NOT MEET THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF WILLFUL HOW CAN THE 
FINDINGS BE SUPPORTED. 
JUDGE SAWAYA ALSO FOUND: 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW 
REQUIRING PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE ANTI-SOCIAL AND 
CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM THE MORAL NORMS OF 
SOCIETY. 
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JUDGE SAWAYA CITES NO SUBSIDIARY FACTS* AND NOT WITH 
SUFFICIENTLY DETAIL* TO DISCLOSE HOW HE CAME TO THIS 
CONCLUSIONS. THERE ARE NO FACTS OF ANY KIND IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT THESE FINDINGS. THE RECORD SHOWS THE APPELLANT TO 
HAVE RESPECT FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM. A FACT WITH IS CLEAR IN 
THE WAY THE APPELLANT IS PROCEEDING WITH THIS CASE AND NOT 
TRYING TO CIRCUMVENT THE LEGAL SYSTEM ALONE. 
CONCLUSION 
IF YOU BELIEVE THE APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS THE APPELLANT 
DOES NOT CARE FOR HIS DAUGHTER AND WOULD NOT BE HARMED BY 
THE TERMINATION OF VISITATION RIGHTS. WHO THEN IS BEING 
HARMED BY THIS ORDER? MY DAUGHTER. LAURA. WHO JUDGE SAWAYA 
HAS. IN EFFECT. LEGAL KILLED HER FATHER. I T IS LAURA WHO 
DOES NOT HAVE A FATHER FOR HER FATHER-DAUGHTER PARTIES. IT 
is LAURA WHO DOES NOT HAVE A FATHER AT HER GRADUATION FROM 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL. IT IS LAURA THAT HAS NO FATHER TO SHARE 
HER LIFE WITH. I DON'T KNOW HOW A PARENT WHO LOVES HER CHILD 
CAN STANDBY AND ALLOW THE PUNISHMENT TO TAKE PLACE. I CANNOT 
AND THEREFORE I ASK THIS COURT TO REVERSE JUDGE SAWAYA's 
ORDER AND ALLOW LAURA TO HAVE CONTACT WITH HER FATHER. SlNCE 
I DO NOT HAVE THE INCOME TO RESTORE VISITATION THOUGH JUDGE 
SAWAYA REQUIREMENT NOR ThE INCOME TO CONTINUE THOSE P A Y M E M S 
ONCE RESTORED. I HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO APPEAL TO THIS COURT 
TO RESTORE MY VISITATION. NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY 
OPTION REALISTICALLY THAT I HAVE BUT BECAUSE I HAD SHOWNED 
THAT IT LEGALLY CORRECT TO DO SO. 
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ALTHOUGH NOT ARGUED, APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE RIGHTS 
AND WISHES OF HIS DAUGHTER; L.AURA, ARE BEING SEVERELY 
ABRIDGED WITHOUT A CHANCE FOR HER TO BE REPRESENTED AND THAT 
THE EMOTIONAL HARM BEING DONE IS INCAPABLE OF RESTORATION. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
LLOYD COLEY, APPELLANT. 
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A 
CASES THAT HELD THAT IT IS IMPROPER 
TO DENY A FATHER'S VISITATION MERELY FOR 
HIS FAILURE TO PAY SUPPORT 
COLORADO 
KANE V. KANE,(1964) 154 COLO 440, 390 P.2D 361. 
FLORIDA 
HOWARD V. HOWARD,(1962, FLA APP D3) 143 SO 2 D 502 (BY 
IMPLICATION); CHAFFIN V GRIGSBY, (1974, FLA APP D 4 ) 293 so 
2D 404 (BY IMPLICATION); HECHLER V HECHLER, (1977, FLA APP 
D3 ) 351 so 2D 1122 (EY IMPLICATION); ACKER V ACKER, (1978, 
FLA APP D 2 ) 365 so 2D 180; FRAZIER V FRAZIER, (1981, FLA APP 
D 2 ) 395 so 2D 590; OLSON V OLSON, (1981, FLA APP D3) 398 sO 
2s 491; MADDUX v MADDUX, (1986, FLA APP D4) 495 so 2D 863, 
11 FLW 2129. 
GEORGIA 
PRICE v DAWKINS (1978) 242 GA 41, 247 SE 2D 844. 
IDAHO 
WILSON v WILSON (1953) 73 IDAHO 326, 252 P.2D 197. 
ILLINOIS 
COMISKEY V COMISKEY (1977, 1ST DIST) 48 ILL APP 3 D 17, 8 ILL 
DEC 925, 366 NE2D 87, APP DEN 66 ILL 2D 629, LATER 
PROCEEDING (1ST DIST) 125 ILL APP 3D 30, 80 ILL DEC 541, 465 
NE2D 653, LATER PROCEEDING (1ST DIST) 146 ILL APP 3D 804, 
100 ILL DEC 364, 497 N'E2C 342 (EY IMPLICATION); HESS V HESS 
(1980, 3D DIST) 87 ILL APP 3D 947, 42 ILL DEC 882, 409 NE2D 
497. 
IOWA 
SWEAT v SWEAT (1974)238 IOWA 999, 29 NW2D 180; SMITH V SMITH 
(1966) 258 IOWA 1315, 142 NW2D 421 (APPARENTLY RECOGNIZING 
RULE); KLOBNOCK V ABBOTT (1981, LOWA) 303 NW2D 149. 
LOUISIANA 
ROSHTO v ROSHTO (1949) 214 LA 922, 39 SO2D 344 (BY 
IMPLICATION:), CROOKS v CROOKS (1982, LA APP 3D CIR) 425 SO2D 
344 (BY I M P L I C A T I O N ) . 
MARYLAND 
RADFORD v RADFORD (1960) 223 MD 483, 164 A2D 904, 88 ALR2C 
140; STANCIL v STANCIL (1979) 286 MD 530, 408 A2D 1030. 
MICHIGAN 
STEVENSON V STEVENSON (1977) 74 MICH APP 656, 254 NW2D 337. 
MINNESOTA 
VAN ZEE v VAN ZEE (1974) 302 MINN 371, 226 NW2D 865; ENGLAND 
v ENGLAND (1983, MINN) 337 NW2D 681 (BY IM P L I C A T I O N ) . 
MONTANA 
STATE EX REL. WILLIAMS V WILLIAMS (1983, MO APP) 647 SW2D 
590. 
NEW JERSEY 
WAGNER v WAGNER (1971) 165 NJ SUPER 553, 398 A2D 918 (EY 
IMP L I C A T I O N ) ; RE ADOPTION OF P. (1980) 175 NJ SUPER 420, A2D 
1135 (EY I M P L I C A T I O N ) . 
NEW YORK 
FARHI V FARHI (1978, 4TH DEPT) 64 APP DIV 2D 840, 407 NYS2D 
840; CHIRUMBOLO v CHIRUMBQLO (1980 4TH DEPT) 75 APP DIV 2D 
992, 429 NYS2D 112, ENGRASSIA V PI LULLO (1982, 2D DEPT) 89 
APP DIV 957, 454 NTS2D 103. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES ON BEHALF OF SALLIE M.H. V JAMES C D . ( 1 9 8 3 ) 119 
MISC 2D 649, 464 NYS2D 942. 
OHIO 
JOHNSON V JOHNSON (1977, SUMMIT CO) 52 OHIO APP 2 D 180, 6 
OHIO OPS 3D 170, 368 NE2D 1273; FLYNN V FLYNN (198^, MADISON 
CO) 15 OHIC APP 3D 34, 15 OHIO BR 57, 472 NE2D 388. 
OKLAHOMA 
RE MCMENAMIN (1957, OKLA) 310 P2D 381 (EY I M P L I C A T I O N ) . 
PENNSYLVANIA 
COMMONWEALTH EX REL. LOTZ V LOTZ (1958) 188 PA SUPER 241, 
146 A2D 362, AFFD 396 PA 287, 152 A2D 663. 
SCUTH CAROLINA 
GARRIS v MCDUFFIE (1986, APP) 288 sc 637, 344 SE2D 186. 
TEXAS 
GANI V GANI (1973, TEX CIV APP TEXARKANA) 500 SW2D 254. 
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1 2:00 p.m. NOVEMBER 26, 1990 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Holmgren, Mr. Coley is present. 
3 He's requested that I put this to the end of the calendar. 
4 Do you have any objection? 
5 MR. HOLMGREN: Only that I would just like to be 
6 first. 
7 THE COURT: Why will this take any more time than 
8 I think it will take. Shouldn't take very long. 
9 MR. COLEY: There are three or four matters, Your 
10 Honor, there's a motion to strike objections to the orders 
11 and two orders to show cause. Each one is going to require 
12 some testimony. I anticipate it will take some time. 
13 THE COURT: I doubt that it will take as much 
14 time as he anticipates. I think he has some apprehension 
15 about all these attorneys watching his performance. Why 
16 don't we put it over to the end. 
17 (4 o'clock p.m.) 
18 THE COURT: What are we doing? 
19 MR. COLEY: I believe it is my motions. 
20 THE COURT: Pardon? 
21 MR. COLEY: I believe it is my motion, objections 
22 to order to show cause, to proposed minute order and order 
23 to show cause and motion to strike the proposed order. 
24 THE COURT: Well, okay, I guess the first thing 
25 we need to do is consider your objections to the proposed 
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1 order. 
2 MR. COLEY: What I would like to first do is do 
3 the motion to strike. 
4 THE COURT: To strike what? 
5 MR. COLEY: To strike the proposed order. 
6 THE COURT: That's denied. That didn't take 
7 long, now do you want to to talk about your objections, 
8 too? 
9 MR. COLEY: Yes. I don't get a chance to argue 
10 on those objections? 
11 THE COURT: Strike the order, why do you want to 
12 strike the order? 
13 MR. COLEY: There's several reasons. There's a 
14 motion to strike it. 
15 THE COURT: You have to speak up. 
16 MR. HOLMGREN: It's not an order yet. We have 
17 submitted a proposed amended order to the court and I 
18 suppose that — so I am standing in here to speak in favor 
19 of that proposed amended order. I submitted it to the 
20 judge — to the court a few weeks ago, I believe and— 
21 THE COURT: I have been holding it, waiting for 
22 his objections and did you file objections? 
23 MR. COLEY: Sure did, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Are they in the file? I have 
25 never seen them. 
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1 MR. COLEY: I believe so. I don't know if they 
2 are in the court file or not. 
3 CLERK: They were filed October 29. 
4 THE COURT: Have I signed these orders to show 
5 cause? Who stamped them? 
6 MR. COLEY: I believe Anita did. 
7 CLERK: And you approved the hearing. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Objections to proposed order 
9 and findings of fact, is that what you are — 
10 MR. COLEY: Prior to that is a motion to strike 
11 those, I think simply stating just a couple things, there's 
12 no authority to amend the order right now. Rule 52A says 
13 that there has to be findings of fact and conclusions of 
14 law. Mr. Holmgren in his proposed order still doesn't have 
15 conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals said immediately 
16 that Rule 52B provides that they have ten days in which to 
17 modify, 59B and E gives you ten days in which to modify 
18 orders. He's had ten days after the order was vacated, the 
19 order is way past the time. That's the basis of the motion 
20 to strike, plus number four, the motion to strike his 
21 inflammatory statements made in there. I can address 
22 those. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, the Court of Appeals, as I 
24 understand it, referred this back to me to make findings of 
25 fact as a basis for the order that I made and you have 
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1 submitted proposed findings of fact. 
2 MR. HOLMGREN: Yes, that is what that is. 
3 Contained within that proposed amended order are proposed 
4 findings of fact. 
5 THE COURT: Amended order on order to show cause, 
6 okay, findings of fact. You are saying that he has to make 
7 conclusions of law? 
8 MR. COLEY: That is correct. I think it is a 
9 case—it is one of of your cases, to have findings of fact 
10 and conclusions of law. 
11 THE COURT: I don't know, do you want to make 
12 some conclusions of law, as well, counsel? All it would 
13 would be based on is the findings that — the findings 
14 would be the same as the — the conclusions would be the 
15 same as the order. 
16 MR. HOLMGREN: Yes. On the next to the last 
17 page, Your Honor, of the proposed amended order it says 
18 that based upon the above findings of fact, it is hereby 
19 ordered and adjudged and decreed, that is, simply to put 
20 conclusions in there would simply be a duplication of the 
21 conclusion that you have reached and the order. 
22 THE COURT: That's what the conclusions would be. 
23 MR. COLEY: I am sure that probably the 
24 conclusions need to be itemized and how can I argue against 
25 them? How can I say, no, the facts don't bear that out? 
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1 He needs to itemize it. 
2 THE COURT: I disagree, I don't think he needs to 
3 make specific conclusions of law, when he's concluded— 
4 MR. COLEY: Okay, the second point of the thing, 
5 we had the same discussion prior to this when I filed my 
6 first objections. He said there was no findings. He said 
7 he didn't need to have findings. You gave the same 
8 argument you just gave. They were incorporated. The Court 
9 of Appeals said, no, they were not incorporated, I think we 
10 are at the same point again. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Holmgren. 
12 MR. HOLMGREN: I don't understand what he is 
13 trying to say there. 
14 THE COURT: He said you haven't made findings of 
15 fact as required by the Court of Appeals, as I understand 
16 it. 
17 MR. HOLMGREN: In this amended order? 
18 MR. COLEY: That is correct. There's no 
19 conclusions. That's here in Salzetti vs. Backman. 
20 MR. HOLMGREN: You have already said that you 
21 agreed with my point on the conclusions of law. If he is 
22 saying I haven't proposed any findings of fact# there they 
23 are identified on page two as findings of fact. 
24 MR. COLEY: Okay, in Salzetti vs. Backman out of 
25 638 P2d at 543, the Supreme Court of Utah states "failure 
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1 to memorialize judgment of contempt by entering written 
2 findings of fact and conclusions was fatal to the 
3 enforceability of the contempt order—" 
4 THE COURT: Counsel, I want to you redo these, 
5 make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
6 then a separate order, okay? 
7 MR. HOLMGREN: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: That should satisfy that objection. 
9 MR. HOLMGREN: I will do that. 
10 THE COURT: What else. 
11 MR. COLEY: This motion is — this proposed order 
12 is not stricken, so I don't have to argue the objections to 
13 this proposed order. 
14 THE COURT: We will wait until you get his new 
15 findings and conclusions then you can—I am not going to— 
16 MR. HOLMGREN: Otherwise we'll go through this 
17 again. 
18 THE COURT: Let's hear what the objections — 
19 what are your objection to the findings? 
20 MR. COLEY: I would like to stand up here. I 
21 apologize to the court for being back in front of it so 
22 many times. 
23 THE COURT: Well, I suppose you are trying to 
24 stay out of jail. That's what you are trying to do. I 
25 don't blame you for that at all, Mr. Coley. 
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1 MR. COLEY: And the file is growing. It's now 
2 getting a little large. 
3 THE COURT: You will have to speak up, I have 
4 trouble— 
5 MR. COLEY: I believe what's happened here since 
6 I am doing this case pro se, Mr. Holmgren, as he told the 
7 Court of Appeals he would give me great latitude decided 
8 that that latitude allowed him to do many things that he's 
9 never done before. 
10 THE COURT: I think what Mr. Holmgren said I was 
11 giving you great latitude. I haven't been giving him great 
12 latitude but giving you latitude to let you stay out of 
13 jail in order to let you do all of thisf letting you stay 
14 out of jail. What's wrong with the findings? 
15 MR. COLEY: The findings of fact number one, I 
16 don't have — well, I do, the amount of the figure in 
17 number one the amount of 27,305, that's the amount that he 
18 argued for in — 
19 THE COURT: Well let's not waste a lot of time 
20 Mr. Coley, I haven't got the time to waste, you disagree 
21 with the amount? 
22 MR. COLEY: I disagree with the amount. 
23 THE COURT: How much do you owe? 
24 MR. COLEY: I think an accounting needs to be 
25 done. 
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1 THE COURT: You tell me how much you owe. If you 
2 don't have a figure then I am going to accept his figure. 
3 MR. COLEY: I don't have a figure. I would like 
4 to do an accounting. I would like the opportunity to do 
5 that. 
6 THE COURT: That's fine, do your own accounting, 
7 but until then I am accepting this as the amount you owe. 
8 MR. COLEY: Let me make this point then, this is 
9 the same amount he said I owed at the June 18 hearing, 
10 1990—June 18, 1990. 
11 THE COURT: You will be given credit for whatever 
12 amount you have paid subsequent to the determination of 
13 this amount. 
14 MR. COLEY: Number two, he mentions a four 
15 hundred and five hundred dollar payment. However, the 
16 figure in number one does not change, and in this hearing 
17 he's denied ever — the existence of these two payments 
18 that he now gives me credit. 
19 THE COURT: What's wrong with number two? Says 
20 with the exception of a $400 payment in November of '88 and 
21 a hundred dollars payment in December of '88, you have not 
22 paid any support for four years. 
23 MR. COLEY: One of the things that's wrong, I 
24 admit makes no sense is to say this one part, for some four 
25 years not because defendant didn't try to collect. I don't 
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1 know what that means. 
2 THE COURT: It means that the defendant has been 
3 making efforts to collect her child support. Do you deny 
4 that. 
5 MR. COLEY: No, I don't deny that. What he is 
6 trying to say I have not made any payments because—I don't 
7 know what he's trying to say. He shouldn't say that that 
8 is not the reason payments have not been made because she 
9 is trying to collect, I don't think that makes sense. 
10 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
11 MR. COLEY: Nowf I believe the court 
12 probably—number three is probably correct or what's — 
13 THE COURT: Are you planning to go through all of 
14 these one by one? 
15 MR. COLEY: Not all of them, because it's not 
16 important to do all of them. However, there's some things 
17 that are very important to talk about. Number four, Mr. 
18 Coley, starting in the middle, Mr. Coley is much more 
19 intent on resisting his ex-wife's attempts to collect 
20 support and the court's directives than he is in raising 
21 money to support." And you have a copy. I don't see it 
22 anywhere where any of that is ever said by you and any of 
23 it was ever entered into--• 
24 THE COURT: I wouldn't have found you in contempt 
25 of court if I would not have felt that way. 
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1 MR. COLEY: I will not argue what you would not 
2 have done or would have done. I can't argue that. 
3 THE COURT: What I have found, Mr. Coley, to make 
4 it very simple to you, that you are educated, you are 
5 healthy, you are capable and you have the ability to get a 
6 job and earn money, that's what I have found. 
7 MR. COLEY: And I have no objections to that, 
8 Your Honor. I have objections to him saying the other 
9 things he said in here, and I think that you have not found 
10 them in the court transcript. They are not in the court 
11 transcript. That's why I had it made up. No conclusions 
12 were made. What Mr. Holmgren is trying to do is trying to 
13 take a hearing that had already occurred and then take the 
14 Court of Appeals vacation of your order and say we'll make 
15 the hearing fit this Court of Appeals vacation. It is not 
16 done. 
17 THE COURT: I will tell what you I am going to 
18 do, I will take these findings and I am going to amend them 
19 to suit my satisfaction. I will make my own findings and 
20 Mr. Holmgren will be satisfied with them as will you. 
21 MR. COLEY: Okay, I appreciate that. You know 
22 there are things — 
2 3 THE COURT: You may not like what I end up doing. 
24 These are going to be the findings that the court makes, 
25 and usually counsel prepares findings and submits them to 
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1 the court. 
2 MR. COLEY: I understand. 
3 THE COURT: I go over them, look them over. If I 
4 like them, I sign them. If not, I amend them. I intend to 
5 amend these findings to to suit my own feel of what the 
6 evidence supports in terms of findings of fact and 
7 conclusions of law. 
8 MR. COLEY: I appreciate that. I have no 
9 argument. 
10 THE COURT: If you wait before preparing the next 
11 set, Mr. Holmgren, I will get this back to you with my 
12 amendments. 
13 MR. HOLMGREN: Okay. 
14 MR. COLEY: The other two matters, I have served 
15 orders to show cause— 
16 THE COURT: What do you want — what kind of 
17 relief are you asking with regard to those? 
18 MR. COLEY: First relief—several reliefs. 
19 THE COURT: You want her to show cause why— 
20 MR. COLEY: For denying visitation. 
21 THE COURT: She was doing that pursuant to the 
22 order of the court. 
23 MR. COLEY: I am not talking about last time. 
24 THE COURT: What is the original order regarding 
25 visitation? 
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1 MR. COLEY: There's no order regarding 
2 visitation. 
3 MR. HOLMGREN: Every other weekend. On the 
4 weekends when he doesn't have visitation, he has it every 
5 Friday — in other words every other weekend and then over 
6 on these weekends he has it every Friday. 
7 THE COURT: Alternate weekends he has it on — 
8 every other weekend he has visitation, then on alternate 
9 weekends he has visitation on Fridays only. 
10 MR. COLEY: That is right. 
11 MR. HOLMGREN: Then I think he has three weeks in 
12 the summer. 
13 THE COURT: And what is your contention regarding 
14 that? 
15 MR. COLEY: Okay. Simply that since the order 
16 was signed—this is an amended order giving me three weeks 
17 visitation. I never received it except the first time in 
18 August I had it. The next six times—or for six years 
19 consecutively she's found an excuse why not to give it to 
20 me, she very seldom gives me visitation on alternate 
21 Fridays. She said it is inconvenient. She's filed 
22 motions. She said it is inconvenient for her. She doesn't 
23 want to have it anymore. She denied my visitation from 
24 February 8, '89 to January or December of 1989. 
25 THE COURT: When did you last visit with your 
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1 child? 
2 MR. COLEY: I had her on Thanksgiving. What I 
3 wanted to bring up since this order was vacated, it's taken 
4 me seven to ten phone calls each time to arrange for 
5 visitation. What I would really like is a couple things. 
6 I would like to have a place where I could pick up my 
7 daughter certain every week so that I can know I can be 
8 there. So I don't have to go up there and wait three or 
9 four hours. I would like to have more time in the 
10 summertime to be with my daughter—she's denied me for the 
11 seven years or six years that she's denied my summer 
12 visitation. And then the other thing I would like, Your 
13 Honor, is I have had to prepare because of this order, this 
14 proposed order I have had expenses of preparing the 
15 transcripts so that we could find out what really went on 
16 and I would like to be credited with the cost of the 
17 transcripts and the cost that it's cost me which is about a 
18 hundred fifty dollars towards payments. 
19 THE COURT: You know, what is going to happen 
20 here, Mr. Coley, I guess you don't realize what is 
21 happening. The Court of Appeals didn't deny my right to 
22 order you not to have visitation with your child, what they 
23 did is say that the order wasn't supported by proper 
24 findings. 
25 MR. COLEY: I understand that. 
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1 THE COURT: What is going to happen, I am going 
2 to make proper findings and again enter an order denying 
3 you visitation. 
4 MR. COLEY: But, Your Honor, may I ask this 
5 question? If there are no facts, if in this transcript 
6 here there's no evidence that shows that it is in the best 
7 interest of my daughter to be denied my visitation, can you 
8 now enter in in findings of fact in a hearing that didn't 
9 have evidence in it? 
10 THE COURT: I found initially that there were 
11 sufficient facts upon which to base that order. I am going 
12 to prepare findings of fact that will support that order 
13 now. And I am going to enter it so you will again be 
14 denied visitation. 
15 MR. COLEY: I think the court will vacate it as 
16 soon as you enter that. 
17 THE COURT: I guess you will have to keep going 
18 back through that. 
19 MR. COLEY: I will go back. And it has to be 
20 done in the best interests of the child. That's what the 
21 law says. There's no findings in here, no evidence of the 
22 best interests of the child being served by my being 
23 denied--
24 THE COURT: I found differently. Apparently, you 
25 and I see the evidence quite differently. 
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1 MR. COLEY: The transcript is here. 
2 THE COURT: There's the issue of your contempt. 
3 When do we get to that? 
4 MR. COLEY: I asked for a review hearing. I was 
5 told as long as I kept the payment up— 
6 THE COURT: Have you kept them up? 
7 MR. COLEY: If you give me credit for the hundred 
8 fifty dollars, I have a hundred dollars to pay her today, 
9 that will — 
10 THE COURT: What I am talking about is payments 
11 made to your wife for the support of your child. 
12 MR. COLEY: That's what I am talking— 
13 THE COURT: Did you make a payment today? 
14 MR. COLEY: I have it with me to make today, a 
15 hundred dollars today. I would like credit for the hundred 
16 fifty dollars because I had to — 
17 THE COURT: What's the present order, Mr. 
18 Holmgren, I can't — I can't keep track of this. 
19 MR. HOLMGREN: Well — 
20 THE COURT: With regard to support payments what 
21 he's supposed to be doing. 
22 MR. HOLMGREN: Two hundred fifty dollars 
23 on-going. But to stay out of jail, you told him fifty 
24 dollars a week, and I have provided you with an exhibit 
25 that shows that he has not done that. It is Mr. Coley's 
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1 of Appeals but I do need a foundation in which for me to 
2 appeal your order. 
3 THE COURT: All you need to do is—there's 
4 nothing in the record in this case that would support a 
5 finding whether from one hearing or another. 
6 MR. COLEY: When you do your findings, could I ask 
7 you to identify where they come from? 
8 THE COURT: You can ask me to but I am certainly 
9 not going to. 
10 MR. COLEY: All right. 
11 THE COURT: We will recess. 
12 (recess) 
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054 
Attorney at Law 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. 
vs. 
NANCY P. 
COLEY, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
COLEY, ] 
Defendant. 
i Case No. D 81 5126 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COME NOW the undersigned and, in response to Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause, respond to each numbered 
paragraph of Plaintiff's Motion as follows: 
1. Paraa. 1. Admit. 
2. Paraa. 2. Admit the existence of the order but deny 
Plaintiff's representation of its contents. The precise wording 
of the Order is: 
a. Plaintiff shall be entitled to visitation on 
Friday evenings from 5:00 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on those 
weekends on which Plaintiff has not already been granted 
rights of visitation. 
orders to pay child support. Plaintiff has generally had 
visitation over the years when he wanted it. His calls requesting 
visitation have been sporadic at best. On those infrequent 
occasions when he has called to arrange visitation, sometimes Laura 
has been available to go with him and sometimes she has not. It 
is the rule, and not the exception, that when Plaintiff does call 
he calls just a few hours or maybe a day before he wants 
visitation. Sometimes when Plaintiff has called on such short 
notice Laura has already made plans with her friends or has 
previously scheduled activities. As for Plaintiff's allegation 
concerning the filing, in April 1988, of a petition to modify the 
visitation, the petition requested termination of alternating 
Friday visitations, but Defendant and her counsel are not aware 
whether there was a ruling on that issue and, in fact, do not 
believe there was a ruling. 
7. Paraa. 7. Defendant did file a petition to modify the 
decree in the spring of 1986 to adjust the visitation schedule to 
allow Laura to attend her church meetings on Sundays. What 
Plaintiff thinks Judge Fishier thought of that request is 
incompetent evidence and is based on hearsay and is not proper for 
purposes of an affidavit/verified motion. 
8. Paraa. 8. Defendant admits that during the period of 
February 1989 through November or December 1989 she refused to 
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allow Plaintiff to have visitation• It was Defendant's 
understanding as well as her counsel's understanding that Plaintiff 
had been sentenced to jail for his contempt of court for not paying 
court-ordered child support. Plaintiff failed to report for jail 
as ordered and was evading justice. It was the belief of Defendant 
and her counsel that if Plaintiff was in the State of Utah and 
available to have visitation, that he should be serving his jail 
sentence. However, Defendant did not know whether Plaintiff was 
in the state or not because he just placed phone calls to Laura and 
Defendant did permit Laura to have phone conversations with 
Plaintiff during that time period. Defendant was particularly 
frightened of Plaintiff during this time period because she 
believed that, with the jail sentence hanging over his head, 
Plaintiff might conclude that he "had nothing to lose" and might 
try to either kidnap Laura or harm Defendant out of anger toward 
Defendant for her obtaining the jail sentence against him. 
Defendant is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that 
throughout most of 1989 a constable hired by her attorney tried to 
track Plaintiff down to serve the arrest warrant on him. For much 
of the year Plaintiff could not be located, but toward the end of 
the year the constable did locate Plaintiff at a residence in Salt 
Lake City but Plaintiff would not open the door to be served with 
the warrant. In fact, Defendant is advised that the constable made 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and 
that I understand the representations and information contained 
therein and that the same are true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge, except where made on information and belief, and as to 
those statements made on information and belief, if any, I do 
believe them to be true. 
NANCY'P. 'COLEY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
. ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Personally appeared before me NANCY P. COLEY and signed the 
foregoing document in my presence on this day of , 
19 
Nota 
Commission expires: 
Residing at: 
11 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and 
that I understand the representations and information contained 
therein and that the same are true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge, except where made on information and belief, and as to 
those statements made on information and belief, if any, I do 
believe them to be true. 
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Personally appeared before me RANDALL J. HOLMGREN and signed 
the foregoing document in my presence on this day of 
, 1? . 
IS I 
Notary Public 
Commission expires: 
Residing at: 
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054 
Attorney at Law 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 358-4703 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. 
vs. 
NANCY P. 
COLEY, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
COLEY, 
Defendant. 
i Case No. D 81 5126 
) Judge James S. Sawaya 
AMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
(June 18, 1990) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21. 1990 at 2:00 p.nu and was 
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m.. 
Defendant was represented by counsel, Randall J. Holmgren. 
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, John R. Bucher. 
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion, 
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in 
Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the 
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its 
Order on or about July 13, 1990. On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects 
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the 
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to 
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings 
of fact supportive of the Order denying child-visitation. On 
December 11, 1990, Judge James S. Sawaya signed the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and based upon those Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendant in the principal amount of $27,305.00. This judgment 
includes all child support arrearages ($5,500.00: (9/30/88-
5/30/90), pre-judgment interest (10%) on said delinquent child 
support ($481.03: 9/30/88-5/30/90) and all former judgments against 
Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant ($16,234.48: 4/30/86-1/9/89) 
and the same are hereby merged herein, together with post-judgment 
interest (12%) on said judgments ($5,089.49: 4/30/86-1/9/89). 
2. Plaintiff LLOYD D. COLEY is hereby ordered in contempt 
of this Court and the orders of this Court and he is ordered to 
serve a term of not less than 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
However, the jail sentence is suspended for thirty (30) days at 
which time the court will review the Plaintiff's efforts in making 
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a substantial payment to Defendant for the above judgments. 
3. Plaintiff's visitation rights with the minor child, 
Laura, are hereby terminated until such time as Plaintiff shows to 
this Court that he is concerned about the child's financial support 
and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing child support in 
the amount of $250.00 per month and making a monthly reduction of 
$200.00 toward the reduction of the judgments (child support, 
interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every month 
for a period of four (4) consecutive months. 
4. If Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, 
without making a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court 
shall, without further hearing, again terminate visitation. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby restrained from having any contact 
with Defendant or her daughter, Laura. 
6. This matter is continued to July 16, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. 
and will be continued by the court periodically for the next six 
months or a year. 
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7. Judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendant in the amount of $400.00 for attorney fees and $30.00 in 
costs incurred by Defendant in bringing this proceeding before the 
Court. 
Date: , 19 . 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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